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EVIDENCE-THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY IN NEW MEXICO: State v. Beachum.

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Beachum,1 the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of whether hypnotically refreshed 2 testimony is admissible in a
criminal prosecution. 3 This issue was one of first impression in New
Mexico. The court held that the hypnotically refreshed testimony offered
in this case was inadmissible. 4
In so holding, the court adopted six safeguards for the admission of
hypnotically refreshed testimony. These safeguards were originally promulgated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hurd.' If the
1. 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040
(1982).
2. The court used the terms "refreshed," "induced," and "revived" interchangeably. "Refreshed," referring to present recollection refreshed, will be used in this Note.
There are several ways to refresh a witness' recollection. One common method is for counsel to
hand the testifying witness a memorandum with which to refresh his recollection as to a particular
matter. Almost anything that will refresh the witness' memory may be used. Present recollection
refreshed should be distinguished from past recollection recorded. In past recollection recorded the
witness has no present memory of a fact or facts. A witness in this situation may testify, for example,
that he made the memorandum when the facts were fresh in his mind, although he now has no
present memory of them. McCormick on Evidence § 9 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972). N.M. R. Evid. 612
governs the use of writings to refresh a witness' memory.
3. On appeal, the state framed the issues as whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling
that: (1) hypnosis was so unreliable a method of enhancing the memory of a witness and was so
impermissibly suggestive that testimony following hypnosis was inadmissible; and (2) the identification procedures employed in this case were so suggestive that they were likely to lead to misidentification. 97 N.M. at 685, 643 P.2d at 249. This Note does not discuss the second issue, as it
concerns issues unrelated to hypnotically refreshed testimony.
4. Id. at 689, 643 P.2d at 253. The New Mexico Supreme Court has heard argument on a case
involving hypnotically refreshed testimony. State v. Hutchinson, No. 13,678 (filed May 25, 1981),
is a direct appeal from a murder conviction and sentence of life imprisonment. Hutchinson raises
issues similar to those raised in Beachum, and may provide an opportunity for the supreme court
to accept or reject the reasoning of the Beachum court.
5. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). The safeguards are:
(1) The hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist trained in the use of hypnosis.
(2) The qualified professional conducting the hypnotic session should be independent of and not responsible to the prosecutor, investigator or the defense.
(3) Any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel prior
to the hypnotic session must be in written form so that subsequently the extent
of the information the subject received from the hypnotist may be determined.
(4) Before induction of hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain from the subject a
detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them, carefully
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safeguards are complied with, then hypnotically refreshed testimony is
admissible in New Mexico. The court failed, however, to apply the
safeguards to the facts before it. Instead, the court affirmed the trial court's
order suppressing the testimony on grounds that the lower court's order
was supported by substantial evidence. 6 In affirming the trial court's order,
the court of appeals noted that the trial judge has discretion to decide
whether the prejudicial effect of evidence outweighs its probative value. 7
A more informative approach in Beachum would have applied the newly
adopted standards to the particular facts before the court. Because the
court did not perform this analysis, additional litigation will probably be
required to determine exactly how courts should apply the safeguards.
This Note will provide an overview of the nature of hypnotically refreshed
testimony and case law concerning its admissibility. The Note will also
examine the reasoning of the New Mexico Court of Appeals with specific
attention focused on the adopted safeguards and their application to the
Beachum fact situation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Early in the morning on July 8, 1980, an assailant sexually assaulted
the victim in her bedroom. 8 The assailant, armed with a knife, forced
her to engage in sexual intercourse and then robbed her.9 Some time later
the defendant, Ronald Beachum, was arrested on an unrelated charge of
criminal sexual contact.'" While jailed on this offense, he voluntarily
agreed to appear in a lineup. " At this lineup the victim identified Beachum
by his voice as her assailant, but was unable to identify him by sight.' 2
avoiding adding any new elements to the witness' description of events.
(5) All contacts between the hypnotist and the subject should be recorded so that
a permanent record is available for comparison and study to establish that the
witness has not received information or suggestion which might later be
reported as having been first described by the subject during hypnosis. Video
tape should be employed if possible, but should not be mandatory.
(6) Only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any phase of the
hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and post-hypnotic interview.
Id. at -, 432 A.2d at 89-90.
6. 97 N.M. at 691, 643 P.2d at 255.
7. Id. N.M. R. Evid. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."
8. 97 N.M. at 683, 643 P.2d at 247.
9. Id.
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-12 (Cum. Supp. 1982), defines the crime of criminal sexual contact.
1I. The lineup consisted of the defendant and two other men. 97 N.M. at 691, 643 P.2d at 255.
12. Id. at 683, 643 P.2d at 247.

Spring 1983]

EVIDENCE

The Roswell Police Chief hypnotized the prosecutrix. ' Those present
during the hypnotic session included the prosecutrix, the Police Chief, a
police sergeant, and two other people. 4 While under hypnosis, the victim
viewed a photographic array which included a picture of Beachum. 5 Both
during the hypnotic session and immediately thereafter she identified
Beachum's picture as that of her assailant. 16
This identification resulted in four felony counts against Beachum for
the rape and robbery of the prosecutrix. Prior to trial, Beachum learned
that the victim had been hypnotized and moved to suppress her testimony.' 7 The motion asserted that: (1) hypnosis was not reliable as a
scientific technique; (2) the hypnotic session itself was not scientifically
conducted; and (3) the hypnotist was not qualified as an expert.'"
At the suppression hearing the trial court heard testimony from prosecution and defense witnesses who were experts on hypnosis. 9 The trial
court ordered suppression of a substantial amount of the victim's testimony. 20 The state moved for an interlocutory appeal ,' which was granted,
13. Id. The sexual assault occurred on July 8, 1980; the police chief, Wisnieski, hypnotized the
prosecutrix on August 28, 1980. Chief Wisnieski testified that he had attended a four-day training
course on hypnosis, that he was a member of hypnosis related professional organizations, and that
he had hypnotized 12 crime victims in previous cases. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Specifically, the defendant moved to suppress the prosecutrix's testimony, the testimony of
the hypnotist and others present during the hypnotic session, and all evidence relating to the prosecutrix's statements during and subsequent to hypnosis. Id.
18. Id. The court of appeals stated that:
Additional grounds advanced by the defendant were that: the use of hypnosis
denied the defendant the right to confront the witness against him and to adequately
cross-examine her; defendant was denied due process of law because the hypnosis
session was impermissibly suggestive to the witness; the defendant was denied
effective assistance of counsel because he was not represented by counsel or
present at the time of performing such hypnosis; and by hypnotizing the complaining witness, the State had in effect destroyed material evidence in the case,
namely the prosecutrix' independent recollection of the events in question.
ld.
19. Dr. Bernard L. Diamond testified for the defense. Dr. Diamond is a psychiatrist with extensive
training and experience in hypnosis. He is a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley
(Boalt Hall) and is the author of InherentProblems in the Use of Pre-trial Hypnosis on a Prospective
Witness, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 313 (1980). Dr. Martin Reiser testified for the state. Dr. Reiser is a
former psychology professor, and holds a Ph.D. in education and clinical psychology. Currently, he
is Director of Behavioral Sciences at the Los Angeles Police Department, and Director of the Law
Enforcement Hypnosis Institute. 97 N.M. at 684, 643 P.2d at 248.
20. The trial court ordered that (1)the prosecutrix could not make an in-court identification of
the defendant; (2) she could not testify as to any evidence developed under hypnosis; and (3) she
could testify as to events that occurred the morning of the assault and her voice identification of the
defendant. 97 N.M. at 684, 643 P.2d at 248.
21. The court of appeals stated that the prosecution appealed pursuant to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 393-3(A)(3) (1978). This is not correct. The prosecution actually appealed pursuant to N.M. Stat. Ann.
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and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's suppression of the

testimony.2 2
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The court of appeals based its opinion in Beachum upon three lines of
reasoning. First, the court discussed the nature of hypnosis, its benefits
and pitfalls.2 3 The court noted that although hypnosis has proven highly
valuable in refreshing the memory of eyewitnesses, its principal drawback
was that it can be highly suggestive.24 In this context the court discussed
how other jurisdictions have approached the admissibility issue.25
Second, the court of appeals examined the New Mexico treatment of
other scientific evidence, particularly polygraphic tests. 26 An analogy
between polygraph tests and hypnotically refreshed testimony is useful
because an analysis of their admissibility in evidence proceeds upon
identical lines.2 7 The Beachum court stated that because New Mexico
admits polygraphic evidence with certain safeguards, courts should treat
28
hypnotically refreshed testimony in the same manner. Third, the court
of appeals adopted, but did not discuss, the State v.29 Hurd safeguards for
the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony.
Survey of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony Outside New Mexico
Opinion on the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony is at
best highly diverse. 3" Perhaps this is because of the perceived mystical
nature of hypnosis and the general misconceptions surrounding it. For
example, many people believe that a person's memory records and stores
everything he sees, and that hypnosis merely helps a person retrieve what
§ 39-3-3(B)(2) (1978), which provides that the state may move for an interlocutory appeal from a
decision or order of a district court suppressing evidence. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-3-3(A)(3) (1978),
allows a criminal defendant to appeal an interlocutory order of a district court. The order must
involve "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from such order or decision may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation." Id.
22. 97 N.M. at 691, 643 P.2d at 255.
23. Id. at 686, 643 P.2d at 250.
24. Id.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 30-49.
26. 97 N.M. 686-88, 643 P.2d at 250-52.
27. The analytical approach of the court of appeals was to first determine whether hypnotically
refreshed testimony satisfied the Frye test. See infra text accompanying notes 49-5 1,for an explanation of the Frye test. Once the court found that hypnotically refreshed testimony did meet the
Frye test, it was admissible provided that the proponent complied with certain safeguards. New
Mexico courts use an identical analysis in considering the admissibility of polygraph evidence. See
infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
28. 97 N.M. at 688-89, 643 P.2d at 252-53.
29. Id. at 689-90, 643 P.2d at 253-54.
30. See Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 442 (1979).
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he otherwise could not. Further, many people believe that a hypnotized
person can tell only the truth. Both of these beliefs are incorrect. 3 '
The apparent earliest reported decision considering the admissibility
of hypnotically refreshed testimony is People v. Ebanks.3 2 In Ebanks the
defendant was charged with murder. He attempted to introduce into evidence statements that he had made while under hypnosis which -tended
to show his innocence. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the California Supreme Court stated that "[the law of the United States does
not recognize hypnotism." 33
Recent case law addressing the issue falls into two categories. In the
first category, the defendant seeks to prove his innocence by attempting
to introduce evidence of statements he made under hypnosis. Courts have
uniformly rejected this type of offer of proof.3 4 The second category
involves cases in which a party seeks to introduce the hypnotically refreshed testimony of a witness. State v. Beachum falls into the latter
catgegory.
Courts which have addressed the issue of whether the hypnotically
refreshed testimony of a witness is admissible at trial have generally
followed one of three analyses. First, some courts have held that the fact
that a witness was hypnotized goes to the weight accorded his testimony,
not to the admissibility of the testimony.35 These courts rely on the jury
to give appropriate weight to a witness' testimony in light of the fact that
he was previously hypnotized. 3 6 The danger of this approach is that the
31. Many experts on memory now reject the notion that experiences are permanently "recorded"
in one's memory, opting instead in favor of a "reconstructive view" of memory. See E. Loftus,
Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Loftus & Loftus, On the Permanence of Stored Information in the
Human Brain, 35 Am. Psychologist 409, 415-19 (1980). But see Penfield & Perot, The Brain's
Record ofAuditory and Visual Experience, 86 Brain 595 (1963). Scientific studies and commentators
also reject the notion that hypnotized persons can only tell the truth. See, e.g., Orne. The Use and
Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 Int'l J.Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis 311, 319-20 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Ome]; Rubenstein & Newman, The Living Out of "Future" Experiences Under
Hypnosis, 119 Science 472, 473 (1954). For a general discussion of memory under hypnosis in the
legal setting, and a summary of scientific literature in this area, see Note, The Admissibiliy of
Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1203, 1208-14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note.,
The Admissibility of Testimony].
32. 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
33. Id. at - 49 P. at 1053.
34. See, e.g., People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640. 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979); Jones
v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Cim.App. 1975); State v. Harris, 241 Or. 224, 405 P.2d 492 (1965);
State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1974); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710,
204 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
(1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978);
Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246
A.2d 302 (1968); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1,492 P.2d 312 (1971). Civil cases adhering to
this position include Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974).
36. See Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, -, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (1968).
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jury might be influenced by erroneous preconceptions concerning the
reliability of hypnosis."
The second approach by courts is a constitutionally based analysis of
the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony. The constitutional
issue is whether the admission of such testimony violates fourteenth
amendment due process rights.38 Testimony derived from a pretrial hypnotic session may be so suggestive that the defendant's due process rights
are violated by its admission into evidence.39 Due process requires that
the defendant be afforded a fair trial. Testimony of a previously hypnotized
witness precludes a fair trial when that testimony is so tainted40by suggestion that it does not represent the witness' true recollection.
Courts which have used the constitutional analysis have examined the
hypnotic session in light of the pretrial identification standard developed
by the United States Supreme Court in Stovall v. Denno. 41 Stovall involved
the stabbing death of a Long Island doctor. During the attack, the deceased's wife attempted to help him and was seriously wounded. Because
there was some question as to whether she would survive, the police
brought the defendant to her hospital room, where she identified him as
her husband's murderer.42 In affirming the defendant's conviction, the
United States Supreme Court promulgated a test for measuring the suggestiveness of a pretrial identification procedure. The test mandates an inquiry
into whether the identification procedure "was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that the defendant
was denied due process of law. "'4 The Supreme Court further stated that
this test should be applied to the totality of circumstances surrounding
the identification procedure. 44 Courts applying this test to pretrial hypnotic
sessions examine the hypnotic procedures in detail. In People v. Hughes45
for example, the court required a pretrial hearing to consider whether the
hypnotic procedures utilized were impermissibly suggestive.
37. See supra text accompanying note 31. It is possible that voir dire could mitigate this problem.
38. See, e.g., Note, The Admissibility, of Testimony, supra note 31, at 1218.
39. Id. at 1218-19.
40. Id.
41. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
42. Id. at 295.
43. Id. at 302.
44. Id.
45. 99 Misc.2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Onondaga County Ct. 1979). Although this case is a
county court opinion, it is cited as authority by many jurisdictions that have considered the issue of
the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony. In Hughes, the defendant allegedly raped the
prosecutrix. A clinical psychologist hypnotized her on two different occasions. At both sessions the
prosecutrix identified the defendant as her assailant and related details of the event. The defendant,
prior to trial, moved to suppress her identification testimony. The court held that a pretrial hearing
to determine the suggestiveness of the hypnotic session in question was both proper and necessary.
Id. at -, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 649. See also United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 279-82
(E.D. Mich. 1977); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423, 436 (Mo. 1980).
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State v. Beachum did not follow either of the above analyses: it followed
a third approach. This third approach to the admissibility of hypnotically
refreshed testimony entails establishing that hypnosis is scientifically reliable and that therefore evidence obtained through its use is admissible
47
46
in court. In New Mexico, as in most jurisdictions, Frye v. United States
provides the standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence. In Frye,
the defendant attempted to introduce evidence of the results of a systolic
blood pressure test (polygraph examination) that he had taken. The results
tended to prove his innocence. In affirming the rejection of the offered
evidence, the circuit court stated that for such evidence to be admissible,
the scientific method used "must be sufficiently established to have gained
4
general scientific acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs." 8
If hypnosis satisfies this test, then hypnotically refreshed testimony is
admissible; if it does not, the court suppresses the offered testimony. The
Beachum court followed this analysis, implicitly finding that hypnosis
satisfies the Frye test.49
Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony in New Mexico
In Beachum, the New Mexico Court of Appeals began its analysis by
discussing the nature of hypnosis and the hypnotic trance. Hypnosis may
be defined as "an alteration in consciousness and concentration, in which
the subject manifests a heightened degree of suggestibility, while awareness is maintained." 50 Bodily relaxation and concentration on specific
stimuli induce hypnosis."
After discussing the nature of hypnosis, the court of appeals noted that
hypnosis has proven successful in medical treatment and therapy, as well
as in criminal investigation. In this context the court cited the leading
case of People v. Smrekar.5 2 In Smrekar, the defendant was convicted of
46. See Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. I11.L.F. 1,
11; Note, Evolving Methods of Scientific Proof, 13 N.Y.L.F. 677, 682 n. 15 (1967); see also cases
622 P.2d 986, 991 (1981).
collected in State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, -,
47. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The New Mexico Supreme Court quoted Frye "with approval"
in State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 407, 362 P.2d 788, 789 (1961). The Beachum court noted that
the Trimble court had relied on Frye in its decision. 97 N.M. at 688, 643 P.2d at 252. For a recent
discussion of the Frye test as applied in New Mexico, see Simon Neustadt Family Center, Inc. v.
Bludworth, 97 N.M. 500, 504, 641 P.2d 531, 535 (Ct. App. 1982). One commentator has suggested
that New Mexico no longer applies the Frye test with respect to scientific evidence. Romero, The
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under the New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 N.M.L.
Rev. 187 (1970). The Beachum court noted that New Mexico does apply the Frye test. 97 N.M. at
688, 643 P.2d at 252.
48. 293 F. at 1014.
49. See 97 N.M. at 689, 643 P.2d at 253.
50. Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?,
38 Ohio St. L.J. 567, 570 (1977).
51. Comment, Hypnosis-Its Role and Current Admissibility in the Criminal Law, 17 Willamette
L.J. 665, 667 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Role and Current Admissibility].
52. 68 11. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979).
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shooting a couple in their home. The victims' next door neighbor heard
a noise from their house. Moments later, she saw a person outside that
house. Unable to remember the identity of that person, she underwent
hypnosis. She subsequently identified the defendant as the person she
saw at the scene of the killing. 3 The Illinois Court permitted the testimony,
holding that the testimony of a witness was not automatically inadmissible
because the witness had been previously hypnotized.54 The Beachum
court, citing the Smrekar case, recognized that hypnosis is useful in
restoring memories of unpleasant past experiences that witnesses have
repressed. 55
Rejection of a Per Se Inadmissibility Rule
Beachum argued for a per se inadmissibility rule. 56 In support of this
argument he relied on three cases,"1 all from other jurisdictions, which
held that hypnotically refreshed testimony was inadmissible. In all three
cases, the basis for the rejection of the hypnotically refreshed testimony
was that hypnosis did not satisfy the Frye test for the admissibility of
scientific evidence. Decisions subsequent to Beachum indicate that these
cases initiated a trend toward holding hypnotically refreshed testimony
inadmissible. 58 Significantly, these later decisions also based their hold53. Id. at _., 385 N.E.2d at 852.
54. Id. at __, 385 N.E.2d at 855.
385 N.E.2d at 853).
55. 97 N.M. at 685, 643 P.2d at 249 (citing 68 I11.App. 3d at -,
56. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
57. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); People v. Tait, 99 Mich. App. 19, 297
N.W.2d 853 (1980); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
In State v. Mena, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, escape, and disorderly
conduct. The victim of the assault was hypnotized by two doctors at the insistence of the police.
The Arizona Supreme Court in Mena reaffirmed its decision in State v. La Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547,
611 P.2d 551 (1980), in which one year earlier it had held that hypnotically refreshed testimony
was per se inadmissible. The Mena court's rationale was that hypnosis did not satisfy the Frye test.
, 624 P.2d at 1280.
128 Ariz. at
In People v. Tait, the defendant allegedly threatened a deputy sheriff with a pistol. The deputy
was hypnotized to refresh his recollection of the incident. The prosecuting attorney, an amateur
hypnotist, performed the hypnosis. The prosecution failed to disclose to defense counsel prior to
trial the fact that the deputy had been hypnotized. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that "[h]ypnosis
had not achieved that degree of general scientific acceptance which will permit its introduction."
Id. at __ 297 N.W.2d at 857.
In State v. Mack, the defendant allegedly sexually assaulted the prosecutrix with a switchblade
knife. She was hypnotized by a self-taught lay hypnotist hired by the police. Two police officers
were present during the hypnotic session, both of whom were intimately familiar with the facts of
the case. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that hypnosis did not satisfy the Frye test and therefore
hypnotically refreshed testimony was per se inadmissible. Id. at 768.
58. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); People v.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206,
Pa. - , 436 A.2d 170 (1981). All
313 N.W.2d 648 (1981); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, of these cases held that hypnotically refreshed testimony was inadmissible.
In State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, the defendant was indicted with forty felony counts of
kidnapping and sexual assault. The indictment arose out of eighteen reported rapes over a threeyear period, all following a similar pattern. Seven of the victims had been hypnotized. The defendant,
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ings on a determination that hypnosis does not satisfy the Fr.e test. 59 The
trend represents a minority view at the present time.
The court of appeals in Beachum recognized that a key inquiry is
whether a particular hypnotic session is unduly suggestive. 60 Suggestiveness is undesirable because it might result in the falsification of a pertinent
fact. The six safeguards promulgated in State v. Hurd represent a method
of limiting suggestiveness in a hypnotic session. 6' Therefore, if there is
adherence to the safeguards, the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony is justified. Indeed, the Hurd safeguards eliminate the justification for the per se inadmissible rule. The New Mexico Court of Appeals
relying on State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981), see supra note 57, filed a motion
in limine to suppress the testimony of the previously hypnotized witnesses. The trial court granted
the motion and the state appealed. The Arizona Supreme Court, reaffirming its holding in State v.
Mena, found that hypnosis did not satisfy the Frye test. 132 Ariz. at 199,644 P.2d at 1287. Therefore,
hypnotically refreshed testimony was still per se inadmissible in Arizona. The court, however,
retreated somewhat from its holding in State v. Mena and allowed the hypnotized witness to testify
to facts recalled prior to hypnosis. Id. at 207, 644 P.2d at 1295.
In People v. Shirley, the prosecutrix and the defendant had had sexual relations. The dispute was
whether he raped her or she consented. There were no eyewitnesses. The prosecutrix was both a
heavy drinker and a daily user of tranquilizers. She was hypnotized three months after the alleged
rape, apparently to improve her memory in preparation for trial. Evidence indicated that she had
trouble remembering things from one day to the next. The hypnosis was performed by a deputy
district attorney with another prosecutor present during the entire hypnotic session. For the California
Supreme Court, the key inquiry was whether hypnosis satisfied the Frye test. The court held that it
did not. 31 Cal. 3d at __, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
In State v. Palmer, the defendant was convicted of robbing a coin shop and strangling its owner
to death with an electric cord. Three of the state's witnesses had been hypnotized prior to trial. In
reversing the defendant's conviction, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that:
[U]ntil hypnosis gains acceptance to the point where experts in the field widely
share the view that memories are accurately improved without undue danger of
distortion, delusion, or fantasy, a witness who has been previously questioned
under hypnosis may not testify in a criminal proceeding concerning the subject
matter adduced at the pretrial hypnotic interview.
, 313 N.W.2d at 655. Therefore, although the court did not mention Frye by name,
210 Neb. at
it implicitly found that hypnosis did not meet the Frye test.
Nazarovitch involved the murder of a twelve-year-old girl. Three years to the day after the murder,
one Pamela Wilforg went to the police, saying she had experienced nightmares about the murder
and that she felt she might know something about it. She was hypnotized on three separate occasions.
Based on her hypnotically refreshed testimony, the defendants were indicted for the murder of the
twelve-year-old girl. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that hypnosis did not satisfy the Frye
Pa. at - , 436
test, therefore upholding the trial court's suppression of Pamela's testimony. A.2d at 177-78.
59. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982), in which the
California Supreme Court held hypnotically refreshed testimony inadmissible per se, see supra note
58, is noteworthy in two respects. First, the California court relied on the cases cited by Beachum
in his argument for per se inadmissibility, as well as on the other recent decisions noted above.
Second, the Shirley court, like the courts in Mena, Tait, and Mack, found that hypnosis did not
satisfy the Frye test. Because these two factors differ from the Beachum court's reasoning, it is
doubtful that the New Mexico Court of Appeals would have followed the Shirley position even if
that case had been decided prior to Beachum.
60. 97 N.M. at 687, 643 P.2d at 251.
61. See supra note 5. An examination of the facts in People v. Shirley, see supra note 58, clearly
indicates that the hypnotic session there did not come close to complying with the safeguards.
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declined to accept Beachum's argument for per se inadmissibility. 62 The
court instead followed the "weight of authority '63 and held that hypnotically refreshed testimony was admissible, although the court rejected the
testimony offered in this case.
The Frye Standard
The court of appeals' analysis of hypnotically refreshed testimony followed two lines of reasoning. First, the court discussed the analogous
cases in the area of narco-analysis 64 and polygraph testing, noting that
New Mexico courts have applied the Frye test in determining whether to
admit scientific evidence. The Frye test simply requires a finding that
hypnosis has gained general scientific acceptance in its field. 65 Second,
the court implicitly found that hypnosis satisfied the Frye test. 6 The court
therefore held that hypnotically refreshed testimony was admissible provided that the Hurd safeguards were met.
The court began its analysis with cases involving scientific evidence
analogous to hypnotically refreshed testimony. If scientific evidence does
not satisfy the Frye test, the evidence is then per se inadmissible. In State
v. Lindemuth, 67 the defendant attempted to introduce evidence of exculpatory statements he made under narco-analygis. The New Mexico Supreme Court applied the Frye test to the particular method used, injection
of sodium pentothal. The court found that the use of sodium pentothal
for the purpose of eliciting the truth had not achieved general scientific
acceptance.68 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's re62. The court stated that "[a] rule of per se inadmissibility, we conclude, is unnecessarily broad
and may result in the exclusion of evidence that may be valuable and accurate." 97 N.M. at 688,
643 P.2d at 252.
63. 97 N.M. at 686, 643 P.2d at 250. The court cited the following cases in support of this
contention: United States v. Akward, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979);
United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978); United States
v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); Harding v. State, 5
Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), modified, Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041
(1981); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 1027
(1981); State v. Hurd, 80 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 80 (1981); People v. Lucas, 107 Misc. 2d 231, 435
N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1980); People v. Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Onondaga
County Ct. 1979); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Jorgensen, 8
Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971). See also the civil cases of Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503
F.2d -506 (9th Cir. 1974), and Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1973).
64. Narco-analysis, or narco-therapy, is a procedure in which the subject is injected with a drug
such as sodium amytal (or sodium pentathol), popularly known as truth serum. Under the influence
of the drug, the subject talks freely about previously repressed memories. Campbell's Psychiatric
Dictionary 402 (5th ed. 1981).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
66. 97 N.M. at 688, 643 P.2d at 252.
67. 56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952).
68. Id. at 274, 243 P.2d at 336.
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jection of evidence concerning statements made by the defendant under
narco-analysis.
The court of appeals in Beachum next analyzed State v. Dorsey.69 In

Dorsey, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the results of polygraph
tests were admissible if certain safeguards were followed.7" The significance of this holding to the decision of the court of appeals in Beachum
was that evidence of polygraph results was admitted in a case in which
certain safeguards were followed. The Beachum court stated that " [s]ince
New Mexico permits the introduction of polygraph evidence with certain
safeguards, we believe this same rationale should apply in the case of
hypnotically refreshed recollection of a witness."7"
The next step was for the court of appeals to determine whether hypnosis satisfied the Frye test; if so, hypnotically refreshed testimony was
admissible, as long as the proponent complied with the Hurd safeguards.
The court of appeals saw the issue as whether hypnosis was reasonably
reliable in refreshing a witness' memory, as opposed to eliciting the truth.
The court stated that " [bly noting the crucial distinction between hypnosis
(a memory stimulus) and polygraph testing and narco-analysis (truth elicitors), the concerns over the scientific unreliability of hypnosis as a
truth elicitor can be dispelled. 7 2 In other words, hypnotically refreshed
testimony should be thought of as simply another category of present
recollection refreshed, in which hypnosis is the stimulus that jogs the
witness' memory. Based on such an analysis, the court found that hypnosis
is reasonably reliable in yielding accurate recollections.73 This reasoning
constituted an implicit finding that hypnosis meets the Frye test.
69. 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
70. Requirements for the admission of polygraph evidence had originally been set out in State
v. Lucero, 86 N.M. 686, 526 P.2d 1091 (1974). The requirements were: (1)the test was stipulated
to by both parties; (2) no objection was made at trial; (3) evidence had sufficiently established the
polygraph operator as an expert; (4) there was evidence establishing the reliability of the testing
procedure; and (5) the validity of the test made on the subject had been established. Id. at 688. 526
P.2d at 1093.
At issue in Dorsey was whether requirements (1)and (2) were necessary. 88 N.M. at'185, 539
P.2d at 205. The court held that they were not. Id. Therefore to introduce polygraph evidence in
New Mexico, one must only show that the latter three requirements were met.
71. 97 N.M. at 688-89, 643 P.2d at 252-53.
72. Id. at 687, 643 P.2d at 251 (quoting Comment, Role and CurrentAdmissibilirv, supra note
51, at 675).
73. 97 N.M. at 688, 643 P.2d at 252 (quoting State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at -,
432 A.2d at 92).
This conclusion is sound. See Putnam, Hypnosis and Distortions in Eyewitness Memory, 127 Int'l
J. Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis 437, 444-46 (1979). Putnam indicates that inaccurate recall
under hypnosis can be significantly minimized by proper safeguards employed during the hypnotic
session. Indeed, the problems with eyewitness testimony may be as great as those with hypnosis.
See Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 969 (1977).
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The Hurd Safeguards
After implicitly finding that hypnosis satisfied the Frye test, the court
articulated the safeguards that would enable hypnotically refreshed testimony to be introduced at trial. As a threshold matter, the court of appeals
recognized the need on the part of the proponent of the hypnotically
refreshed testimony to establish the qualifications of the hypnotist as an
expert. 4 This requirement was identical to the one imposed in State v.
Dorsey with regard to polygraph evidence, 75 and is in addition to the
Hurd safeguards. The Beachum court perceived the safeguards as a means
of mitigating the inherent dangers of hypnosis. The court stated that "[t]o
avoid or minimize the possibility of the improper application of hypnosis,
we adopt the six-pronged test laid down by the New Jersey Supreme
Court [in State v. Hurd] for admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony of a witness." 7 6
In Hurd the victim was attacked in the early morning hours in her
bedroom and stabbed repeatedly. There was no sexual assault and she
eventually eluded her attacker. The two prime suspects in the case were
her husband, allegedly asleep in another room, and her former husband,
the defendant. 7 7 The victim was either unable or unwilling to identify her
assailant. She was hypnotized three weeks after the incident. A psychiatrist performed the hypnosis with two police officers present. While
under hypnosis, a police officer questioned her in a highly suggestive
manner.78 After the hypnotic session, both the hypnotist and the police
officers encouraged her to make an identification of her assailant.
The safeguards were originally enunciated in the New Jersey trial court
by Dr. Martin Orne.79 For testimony to be admitted in New Mexico, its
proponent must establish two things. First, it must be established that the
safeguards were complied with at the time when the witness was hyp97 N.M. at689, 643 P.2d at 253.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
97 N.M. at689, 643 P.2d at 253.
86 N.J. at -, 432 A.2d at 88.
The trial court described part of the hypnotic exchange thusly:
In response to questions Mrs. Sell [Prosecutrix] recounted the events and partially
described the clothing and some of the features of her attacker. Mrs. Sell then
commenced to cry hysterically. At that point Pierangeli [police officer] asked Mrs.
Sell if she knew the attacker. Mrs. Sell replied, "Yes." Pierangeli asked, "Is it
David?" [meaning her husband David Sell] Mrs. Sell replied, "No." Pierangeli
then asked, "Is it Paul?"[meaning her former husband Paul Hurd] Crying hysterically Mrs. Sell replied, "Yes."
173 N.J. Super. 333, -, 414 A.2d 291, 293-94.
79. Dr. Orne isa leading authority on hypnosis and is the co-author of an encyclopedia article
on the subject. 9 Encyclopedia Britannica 133 (1974). A psychologist, he heads a major hypnosis
research laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of
Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis. See State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 746, 766 (Minn. 1980).
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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notized. s° Second, compliance with the safeguards must be demonstrated
at trial by clear and convincing evidence .8
The principal purpose of the Hurd safeguards is to limit the suggestiveness of a particular hypnotic session. Suggestiveness is undesirable
because it might result in the serious distortion of a person's recollection.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals adopted the Hurd safeguards verbatim
but failed to apply them to the facts before it. Had the court of appeals
applied the safeguards, the same result would probably have been achieved.
The testimony would have been inadmissible but the court would also
have provided some guidance to the lower courts about the application
of the safeguards.
The first safeguard requires that a psychiatrist or psychologist perform
the hypnosis. The second safeguard requires that a hypnotist independent
of the police or prosecution conduct the hypnotic session. The Roswell
Chief of Police, who was neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist, conducted the hypnotic session in Beachum. Therefore, the state had not
complied with either of the first two safeguards.
The third safeguard requires that all information given to the hypnotist
by law enforcement personnel prior to the hypnotic session be recorded.
One purpose of this procedure is to facilitate later assessment of the
suggestivness of the hypnotic session.8 2 The hypnotist might question the
subject in such a way as to suggest theories of the police as to, for
example, the identity of the subject's assailant. There was no indication
that such a record was made in Beachum.
The fourth safeguard requires that the hypnotist obtain a detailed statement of the facts from the subject before hypnosis. This procedure enables
the hypnotist to learn what the subject can and cannot relate about the
particular event in question. From this information, the hypnotist might
be able to determine areas where the subject is particularly susceptible
to suggestion.8 3 Whether Chief Wisnieski took a detailed statement of the
facts prior to hypnosis was not clear from the record.
The fifth safeguard requires that the hypnotic session be recorded. The
preferred method of recordation is by videotape, which allows subsequent
scrutiny to determine if the hypnotist suggested answers to the subject
by mannerisms, body language, etc. In Beachum an audio tape of the
hypnotic session was made; therefore the state technically complied with
80. 97 N.M. at 690, 643 P.2d at 254.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Teitelbaum, Admissibility of Hypnotically Adduced Evidence and the Arthur Nobb
Case, 8 St. Louis U.L.J. 205, 213 (1963).
83. Id. For example, a subject/victim may think that she knows who her assailant was, but cannot
identify or describe him. Such a person might be highly susceptible to suggestion concerning the
identity of her attacker.
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the fifth safeguard. An audio tape, however, does not allow the subsequent
scrutiny afforded by a videotape.
The sixth safeguard requires that only the hypnotist and the subject be
present during the hypnotic session. A hypnotic session where police4
8
officers or prosecuting attorneys are present could be unduly suggestive.
In Beachum, a police chief (the hypnotist), a police sergeant and two
other people were present. The state therefore failed to comply with the
sixth safeguard.
CONCLUSION
In State v. Beachum, the court of appeals stated that hypnotically
refreshed testimony is admissible in New Mexico. The court implicitly
found that such testimony meets the Frye standard for scientific evidence.
Even though such testimony is admissible, the Beachum court stated that
the proponent of hypnotically refreshed testimony must show that the six
procedural safeguards set forth in State v. Hurd85 were utilized during the
hypnotic session. The safeguards adopted by the court of appeals are
meant to reduce the suggestiveness of hypnotic sessions.
In State v. Beachum, the court of appeals upheld a trial court order
suppressing the hypnotically refreshed testimony offered in that case. The
court of appeals did so on the ground that the trial court order was
supported by substantial evidence. Unfortunately, the court of appeals
did not apply the newly adopted safeguards to the facts of the case.
Therefore, the decision was incomplete. Additional litigation will probably be required to clarify the application as well as the significance of
the newly adopted safeguards.
GREY HANDY

84. See, e.g., Orne, supra note 31, at 336. See also Note, The Admissibility of Testimony, supra
note 31, at 1232 n. 157.
85. See supra note 5.

